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Introduction 
When Ireland became independent in 1922 it still remained part of a common British Isles labour 
market with no restriction on movement between the two jurisdictions. With the exception of the years 
of the Second World War, this was to remain the case (for Irish citizens) right up to the present. By 
contrast, from the end of the 1920s tariffs were introduced in Ireland (and the UK) so that by the mid 
1930s the goods market was subject to very considerable restrictions. The exceptionally high tariff 
barriers remained in place until the end of the 1950s, unlike the situation in most other European 
countries where trade barriers were rapidly reduced in the immediate post-war years. This combination 
of an open labour market and a closed goods market over a sustained period was most unusual in 
Europe. 
In the second half of the 20th century Ireland is also unusual in Europe in the extent of outward labour 
mobility. For most other EU members in the last 30 years there has been little movement of their native 
population to seek work elsewhere in the EU. Instead most member states have seen substantial net 
immigration over this period from outside the EU. This lack of labour mobility between EU member 
states contrasts with the United States where there is considerable movement of working age 
population from one region to another, making the United States a truly common labour market. 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997, show that this mobility of labour within the US has been a factor 
ensuring that local concentration of immigrants in particular states have not had a direct impact on the 
local labour market. 2 
Migration in Ireland has been a two way process with periods of extensive net emigration being 
followed by periods of extensive net immigration. The data also indicate that each year the gross flows 
of emigrants and immigrants have been very large in both directions so that the country simultaneously 
experiences substantial emigration and substantial immigration. It is estimated by Hannan, Sexton, and 
Walsh, 1991, that in the 1970s when gross inward migration amounted to nearly 270,000 there was still 
a sizeable gross outward flow of about 165,000. In the period 1992 to 1997 gross emigration each year 
averaged 0.9% of the population while gross immigration (primarily returning emigrants) has averaged 
1.0% of the population. Generally young people leave in their late teens or early 20s and the returning 
emigrants are in their late 20s or 30s, often accompanied by young children. Cheaper travel costs and 
the gradual convergence of Irish living standards with our EU ( especially the UK) neighbours has 
meant that the migration decision is no longer irreversible. Given reasonable employment prospects, 
Ireland is the preferred final location for former emigrants to spend the bulk of their working lives. 
The economic implications of emigration have received much attention from Irish economists over the 
last 70 years. Geary in 1935 considered this issue in some detail, in particular considering the factors 
that drove emigration. (As part of this discussion he also considered the possible impact on the United 
2 Though immigration has had an impact on the unskilled wage rate at a national level. 
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States of changes in immigration policy.) However, there was somewhat less attention given to the 
potential impact of emigration specifically on the Irish labour market. Walsh, 1968, reviewed the 
factors driving Irish emigration, as well as discussing some of the wider implications for the economy, 
but many of the studies in the 1970s and the 1980s concentrated on modelling the migration decision 
on its own. In a series of recent papers O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995, modelled the effects of 
migration in the late 19th century and the early 20th century on the Irish (and other) economies. 
In this paper we first consider the nature of the migration: who the migrants were, where they went? 
We then discuss the factors that drove this movement in the past and which continue to drive the 
substantial movement of population that is still continuing today. The model, which we derive, is then 
estimated using data from the post-war period. Finally, we consider the implications of these results for 
the labour market today. 
The Data 
The History of Migration in Ireland 
Going back to the 18th century, the tradition of emigration has been a continuing feature of the lives of 
all of the Irish population, rich and poor. It had a particularly important impact on the economy in the 
19th century and the despair and the tragedy that it symbolised is still deeply ingrained in the public 
imagination. This importance is illustrated by recent research that examines the convergence in wage 
rates and living standards between the Irish and the British economies over the second half of the 19th 
century and the early years of the 20th century. O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995, show that migration, 
by reducing the supply of labour in Ireland and increasing it in Britain, played a key role in promoting 
this convergence. 
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In the years since independence in 1922 emigration has been a continuing fact of life in Ireland. Up to 
the 1930s a relatively high proportion of those who left went to the United States. However, in the 
1930s the balance shifted (due to restrictions on US immigration) with the bulk of those leaving going 
to England and Scotland (Freeman, 1938-39 and Commission on Emigration, 1954). The destination of 
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emigrants in more recent years has seen further changes with a growing number going to other EU 
countries outside these islands (Figure 1). 
Figure 2 
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Emigration reached a post-independence peak in the 1950s (Figure 2) with the number going in 1958 
being roughly equal to the number of births in that year. In the 1960s the numbers leaving fell quite 
rapidly so that by the early 1970s there was net immigration. The net flows hid a continuing gross 
outward flow of young labour market entrants, which was counterbalanced by a larger inflow, many of 
whom were emigrants of the 1950s. This pattern repeated itself in the 1980s when emigration again 
reached very high levels in 1988 and 1989, only to be followed by net immigration in the 1990s. 
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In Figure 3 we give a rough estimate of the stock ofrecent emigrants who left in the previous 15 years 
obtained by cumulating the net migration flows over the previous 15 years.3 This measure of the stock 
peaked at over 500,000 in the early 1960s and it fell to zero by the end of the 1970s. The emigration of 
the 1980s resulted by 1996 in a stock of around 200,000 emigrants living abroad. 
3 Because there are substantial gross flows of migrants simultaneously in both directions, this is only a 
crude measure of the stock of emigrants abroad. In addition, while most emigrants are in their late teens 
or early 20s, a significant number of immigrants are the young children of former emigrants, further 
complicating the calculations 
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A more detailed analysis was also carried out using the census data for each five-year period. When 
allowance is made for the small number of deaths, which can be expected in the population under 40, it 
is possible to derive an estimate of the net migration for each cohort by single year of age within each 
intercensal period (Figure 4). This crude estimate takes no account of gross immigration by non-Irish 
citizens which has been significant in the 1990s (Barrett and Trace, 1998). This means that the estimate 
of the stock of emigrants aged 15 to 40 living abroad, derived from this source, will be somewhat of an 
underestimate. While crude, these two independent methods of estimating the stock of emigrants aged 
under 40 living abroad in 1996 suggest figures of something over 200,000. Figure 4 shows that in 1996 
the largest single cohort of emigrants living abroad were in their late 20s or early 30s, having emigrated 
in the late 1980s. The stock of migrants from the early 1980s was much smaller, either because the 
gross outflow in those years was smaller or because they had returned by 1996. 
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Traditionally those who emigrated were predominantly unskilled, many of them from an agricultural 
background. This continued to be the case until very recent times. Analysis of those who emigrated 
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during the war years showed that two thirds of them were labourers (Commission on Emigration, 
1954). Set out in Figures 5 and 6 is an analysis of net emigration, classified by educational attainment, 
for selected years since 1966.4 
In the late 1960s almost two thirds of emigrants had only a Junior (inter) Certificate level of education 
(Figure 5). The proportion with third level education was under 20%. By the early 1980s the balance 
between those with leaving certificates and those with lower (or no) qualifications had shifted but the 
proportion of emigrants with third level qualifications had actually fallen. The second half of the 1980s 
saw a big change in the educational attainment of the emigrants. Around a third of the emigrants had a 
third level education in the late 1980s compared to under 20% in the 1960s and in the late 1980s there 
was very little emigration by people with only a primary education, whereas they accounted for the 
bulk of emigrants in the 1960s. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 6 shows that the proportion of those getting third level qualifications that emigrated was already 
high in the late 1960s. By the late 1980s the proportion of the much larger cohort of 15 to 29 year olds 
with third level qualifications emigrating exceeded 20%. Barrett and Trace, 1998, use data from a 
survey of school leavers to show that the proportion emigrating peaked at 25% or more of graduates in 
the years 1987-89. Only a tiny proportion of those with only primary education emigrated permanently 
in the late I980s.5 This reversed the position that had pertained since the last century. 
4 This analysis is carried out by examining what proportion of each cohort at one census is still in the 
country at the time of the next census (but 5 years older). Some estimation is necessary to arrive at the 
likely final level of educational attainment of those still in the educational system at each census. This 
approximation was done by assuming that the proportion of each cohort (by single year of age) still in 
school in a census year who would be still in school one year later was the same as that for the next 
cohort (by age) in the census year. This analysis is likely to underestimate the final educational level 
attained. As a result, the Figure, if anything slightly underestimates the proportion of emigrants who 
had a leaving certificate or third level education. 
5 Garvey and McGuire, 1989, and Hannan, Sexton and Walsh, 1991, discuss how some of the least 
qualified emigrants did badly on emigration and were forced to return relatively quickly. 
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Part10f the reas<fil for· this change in pattern lies with changes in the social welfare systems in Ireland 
and the UK. In the 1950s, at a time when the UK had developed a sophisticated social welfare safety 
net, no such protection was available in Ireland. As a result, unskilled labour in Ireland faced a choice 
between emigration to the UK, generally to take up employment there, or employment at any price in 
Ireland. However, over the period from 1960 to the early 1980s there were substantial improvements in 
the rates of social welfare payments in Ireland (Figure 7).6 By the early 1980s the rate of social welfare 
payments effectively set a minimum wage. However, the ultimate effect on numbers unemployed in the 
1970s was probably small; the social welfare system in the UK was more attractive than that in Ireland 
and rates of pay for unskilled labour in the UK exceeded those in Ireland making emigration a feasible 
option. Over the course of the 1980s, as the Irish social welfare system was further improved, it 
became more attractive to be unemployed in Ireland than unemployed in the UK. In addition, there was 
a rapid rise in unemployment in the UK, especially among unskilled, which had a knock on effect in 
Ireland. Finally, the rates of pay for unskilled labour in Ireland approached, and in some cases 
exceeded, those in the UK. Hannan, Sexton and Walsh, 1991, show that unskilled emigrants faced 
major difficulties in the UK labour market in the late 1980s, difficulties they would not have faced in 
earlier periods. This contrasts with the earlier generation in the 1950s who faced very difficult 
circumstances at home and who could generally improve their living standard by leaving. 
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While those with a good education are now more likely to emigrate than those with only a primary 
education, they are also more likely to come back. As shown in Figure 8, in 1991 over a quarter of all 
those over 40 (males and females) with a third level education had lived abroad for at least a year. For 
all other educational categories the proportion was 10 or 15%. While the latter figure is exceptionally 
high by the standards of other EU countries, it still suggests a much lower return rate than for those 
with third level education. It means that even in the face of continuing substantial gross outflows, the 
fact that individuals return with additional experience from working abroad may actually enhance the 
6 The unskilled wage rate is defined here as the wage rate in the clothing sector, a sector where the bulk 
of those working have limited educational attainment. 
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return from edueation. Barrett and Trace, 1998, show that for those who returned to Ireland in the year 
ended April 1996, aged 25 to 29, 57% of them had third level education and for the 30 to 39 cohort 
almost 50% had a third level education. Thus a much higher proportion of those who returned to 
Ireland in that year had a third level education than was the case for those who emigrated in the late 
I980s.7 
Figure 9 shows the corresponding figures for 1996, though the data are not yet available to break down 
the population by educational attainment. The increase in the proportion of 30-34 year olds who have 
lived abroad between 1991 and 1996 clearly reflects the impact of the return of the large numbers who 
emigrated in the late 1980s. However, as discussed above (Figure 4), there still remains a substantial 
stock abroad of those who left in the 1980s. 
Causes of Emigration 
Since mass emigration began from Ireland two hundred years ago the economic factors driving the 
flows have been fairly clear. Men and women have always found it difficult to leave their home but in 
spite of this cost (generally substantially greater than the direct travel cost) the greater labour market 
opportunities elsewhere have proved to be a major attraction. In the post war years the most important 
factor has been the greater employment opportunities, especially in the United Kingdom. The most 
obvious indicator of these greater opportunities has been the difference in the unemployment rates in 
the two jurisdictions. However, many of those who have left in recent years have not been unemployed 
but have rather seen the possibility to earn substantially more in other countries. 
Figure 10 
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7 These data include people who have moved frequently in and out of Ireland who may have a different 
level of educational attainment than the stock of all returned emigrants. In any one year these frequent 
movers will constitute a much higher share of the recent returned emigrants than they do of all returned 
emigrants. 
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A number of studies of the factors driving emigration in Ireland in the post-war period have found that 
it is significantly affected by the differential in unemployment rates between Ireland and the UK 
(Walsh, 1967, Honohan, 1992). Honohan found that the equilibrium gap in unemployment rates 
between Ireland and the UK was around 5 percentage points; at that difference in unemployment rates 
there would be no net flow of migrants out of ( or into) the country. Figure I O shows both emigration in 
recent years (left scale) and the actual gap in unemployment rates between Ireland and the UK (right 
scale), which reached a peak in the late 1980s, around the time that the latest bout of emigration was at 
its maximum. 
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Looking to the future there must be some doubt about the stability of the relationship which held in the 
past where the Irish unemployment rate was 4 or 5 percentage points above the UK rate in equilibrium. 
Figure 11 compares Irish and UK unemployment rates for 1994 by educational attainment. It shows 
that for those with at least a Leaving Certificate, the gap in unemployment rates in 1994 was less than 4 
percentage points and unemployment rates were lower in Ireland for graduates. With the proportion of 
the population who have reached at least Leaving Certificate standard of education continuing to rise, 
the result may be a reduction in the potential gap between unemployment rates in Ireland and the UK. 
Experience indicates that young skilled workers will not remain in Ireland unemployed, preferring to 
emigrate instead. 
The change from unskilled emigration to skilled emigration may render the unemployment rate a less 
reliable indicator of the attractiveness of moving. It is only if the unemployment rate continues to 
reflect tensions in the market for skilled labour that it will be a good predictor of future migration. The 
improved educational attainment of the labour force appears to have made individuals more mobile, 
increasing the elasticity of labour supply. In addition, in recent years when there has been significant 
immigration, some of those entering the Irish labour market were not returning Irish citizens. Instead a 
significant minority were skilled workers from other EU countries and the factors driving their entry 
into the Irish labour market may well prove different from those that drove migration by Irish citizens 
in the past 
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Migratic:>n and the l!abour Market 
As discussed above migration decisions are clearly affected by the relative economic circumstances in 
Ireland and the potential destination for emigrants, generally the UK. However, large-scale migration 
can also have a major impact on the labour market. The work of O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995, 
indicates that the huge migration from Ireland to the UK in the latter half of the 19th century affected 
wage rates in both jurisdictions. What has been the impact of the post-war migration? 
Figure 12 
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So far the evidence is limited on the impact of the more recent migration on the Irish labour market. As 
shown in Figure 12, wage rates appear to have fallen compared to the UK at the beginning of the 
1930s, when protection was introduced. The impact of the war, with a tightening of the labour market 
in the UK and restrictions on migration, led to an albeit temporary further fall to around 40% of those 
in the UK. 8 They remained in the range 40% to 50% of the UK level until 1960. 
Between 1960 and the late 1970s there was a very sharp rise in wage rates in Ireland relative to those in 
the United Kingdom. However, from the end of the 1970s wage rates in Ireland fluctuated around 80% 
to 90% of the UK level. The fluctuations around this trend were largely due to changes in the bilateral 
exchange rate rather than to changes in the rate of growth of wage rates from one year to the next. 
The timing and pattern of the convergence of Irish wage rates to UK wage rates over the last 40 years 
raises a number of interesting questions about the Irish labour market. What are the economic forces 
that explain the convergence? What economic mechanisms could have given rise to the process and 
how can the timing of the convergence throw light on the underlying factors? 
8 The first series in Figure 12 compares hourly wage rates in Ireland with those in the UK. This takes 
no account of labour taxes on employers and other costs of employment. This is the series used later in 
the paper when estimating a model of migration. The second series takes account of differences in non-
wage labour costs by using national accounting series for the wage bill ( divided by employment). 
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®n the,,supply side there has been free movement of labour over a very long period so, on its own, it 
can not explain the convergence in factor prices. However, if the costs of migration had changed over 
time this factor could have resulted in a shift in the equilibrium gap in unemployment rates ( or 
expected earnings) between Ireland and the UK. 9 Falling travel and communications costs have 
undoubtedly made the decision to emigrate much less traumatic than in the era of the "American 
wake". In addition, the falling cost of labour mobility has made possible the situation where much of 
the emigration since 1960 has been temporary in character. 
If the explanation for the convergence lay in reduced costs of migration it should be evident in the 
modelling of the migration decision or, equivalently, of the equilibrium difference in unemployment 
rates (Honohan, 1992). However, because of the restricted data sample, the study described later in this 
paper, can not test this hypothesis. 
A second possible supply side explanation for the convergence is the effect of the opening up of the 
economy and society to the outside world from the late 1950s onwards, typified by EU entry in 1973. 
In earlier decades expectations in Ireland were much lower relative to those in the UK reflecting, 
among other things, a more closed society. The opening up of the economy, the impact of radio and 
television and foreign travel, may all have served to raise expectations of the labour force. If they could 
not get a satisfactory standard of living at home they had the option of moving.10 
A third supply side factor might be the investment in human capital resulting in rising earnings per 
person. However, the investment began in the late 1960s, long after the convergence in wage rates had 
begun, and its full effects on the labour market are only maturing in the 1990s. As a result, the timing 
of this factor tends to rule it out as a major force in the convergence process. 
The opening up of the goods market post 1960 provides a fourth possible mechanism whereby the 
convergence in wage rates took place. The rapid growth in wage rates in Ireland post 1960, 
commencing at the same time as the goods market was liberalised, may be a coincidence. However, 
prior to 1960 Irish firms were producing small production runs for a limited domestic market with a 
low marginal productivity of labour; the freeing of trade and the introduction of new technology in 
firms producing for a wider European market greatly increased labour productivity. As a result, foreign 
firms could afford to pay much higher wage rates than in the past (and higher rates than in existing 
domestic firms). The resulting upward pressure on wage rates undoubtedly contributed to the demise of 
much of the traditional manufacturing sector of the 1950s (see Barry and Hannan, 1996). 
9 The differential in expected earnings between Ireland and the UK at which emigration would be 
expected to be zero. See Harris and Todaro, 1970, for a model of migration decisions. 
10 Another aspect of this convergence was the development of the Irish social welfare system, from a 
situation where it was very much inferior to that of the UK in 1960, to one where benefit rates are more 
generous in Ireland in the 1990s (Callan and Sutherland, 1997). 
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In examining the factcirs driving the convergence in wage rates Fitz Gerald, 1998, suggests that 
probably the single most important explanation for the convergence was the opening up of the goods 
market from 1960 onwards. Up to that point production for a small domestic market involved short 
production runs, a lack of competition, and low productivity. With freeing of restrictions on trade there 
was a gradual growth in the number of (generally) foreign firms producing in Ireland for a wider 
European market. Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988, model the decision on the share of world output 
produced in Ireland as a function of Ireland's competitiveness compared to competing locations, 
especially compared to the UK. In such a model the UK wage rate appears in firms' demand for labour 
function, with firms choosing Ireland as a location while Irish labour costs were lower than the UK -
gradually bidding up wage rates in Ireland. 
However, the free movement of labour has undoubtedly also played a significant role in the process. In 
particular, expectations of wage earners were affected, both directly through migration, and indirectly 
through hearsay concerning the UK labour market. 
To determine more precisely the role of the different factors will require further research using a more 
fully specified model of the economy. 
Modelling the Process of Migration 
The discussion above highlights the openness of the Irish labour market via the migration mechanism 
and, in particular, its integration with the UK labour market. Indeed Krugman (1997) has recently 
argued that the Irish economy is best characterised as a regional economy because of the openness of 
its labour market. Several empirical studies of net migration dating back to the 1970s have attempted to 
estimate the extent of this integration between the Irish and UK labour markets (see Barrett (1998) and 
O'Grada and Walsh (1994) for an overview of these studies) using a simple model of net migration. In 
these models the decision to migrate is, ceteris paribus, driven by relative employment prospects in the 
two economies and the relative return to employment. All of these studies revealed that there are 
significant links between net migration and changes in both relative employment and relative wages 
variables, however there was strong evidence of out-of-sample parameter instability. 
This instability is not surprising. Firstly the model implicitly assumes that all migration is to the UK. 
This assumption is likely to be most problematic for the period of the early 1980s when only 60% of all 
emigration was to the UK with 14 % going to the USA 11 . Secondly it assumes that the characteristics of 
the average migrant have not altered over our sample period. However, as detailed earlier in this paper, 
both the educational profile and to a lesser extent the sex composition of emigrants altered in the period 
from the 1950s to the 1980s. In particular there was a sharp increase in the proportion of emigrants 
with third level education in the 1980s. Thirdly the model does not include any demographic variables 
11 More recent estimates indicate that the share of migrants going to the UK has fallen to 45% of the 
total (Figure 5). 
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(e,g.Ahe natural increase .m the population, the fertility rate) which determine the absolute stock of. 
potential emigrants at any given point in time. Fourthly the model does not allow for the fact that the 
migration decision, and especially return migration, is likely to have been significantly affected by the 
falling real cost of international transport over our sample period. And finally there are difficulties in 
the data used in estimation. Net migration flows relate to the year beginning in April while 
unemployment and wage data refer to the calendar year, and there are frequently very large revisions in 
the net migration data particularly at the time new Census data become available. 
In Kearney (1998) we estimate this basic model over the post-war period, specifically 1951-1995. In 
contrast to previous studies we do not impose a dynamic structure. Instead we embed this basic 
equation within a general dynamic framework and test from this general model to find a more 
parsimonious specification that is congruent with the data. Because of a history of instability in net 
migration equations we also test for evidence of parameter instability. 
Based on this simple model our general equation specifies that net migration is driven by two measures 
of labour market conditions, the relative wage gap between Ireland and the UK and the probability of 
finding employment in Ireland relative to the UK. We specify a simple linear single equation model 
where net migration is modelled as a function of relative employment and relative wages. 
Our preferred equation models net migration in the current year as a function of relative wages (relw) 
and relative employment (relemp) in Ireland and the UK in the previous year. We identify two sub-
periods that fully parameterise the instability detected over the full sample. In the sub-period 1978-
1989 (sl978) the average propensity to migrate rose while in the more recent sub-period, 1990-1995 
(sl 990), the average propensity to migrate fell. 
NMA = + 800.6 - 730.8 relemp(-1) -134.4 relw(-1) + 21.95 sl978- 35.J sl990 
(101. 7) (105.5) (9.0) (3.6) (5.4) 
This estimated equation is in the form of a leading indicator model. Net migration in the current year 
is determined by relative wages and relative employment in the previous year. This formulation 
allows for no feedback from migration to relative wages or relative employment12. Of course net 
migration in the current year will feed into the size of the current year's labour force and hence the 
relative employment variable. However for our purposes this leading indicator formulation, while 
clearly partial equilibrium in nature, is useful in determining a stable causal link between changes in 
relative labour market conditions between Ireland and the UK on the one hand and consequent 
changes in net migration flows on the other. 
12 This is probably capturing the mis-match in the data series. Net migration in the current year refers to 
migration from April in the previous calendar year to April in the current year while the relative wage 
and relative employment data refer to the calendar year. 
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Implications for Labour Market 
Figure 13 
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Figure 13 illustrates that there is a strong negative relationship between net migration and changes in 
the labour force. This relationship is central to our understanding of the determinants of labour 
supply. A simple linear regression fit to this relationship indicates that a unit increase in net migration 
is associated with a 0.58 unit decline in the labour force. This high elasticity of labour supply, 
operating through the migration mechanism, has played a key role in the trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment in Ireland over the past 30 years. 
Changing characteristics of the average migrant and the onset of significant flows of inward migration 
over the past thirty years make it difficult to model migration behaviour. In our model we identify two 
structural breaks over the sample - the sub-periods 1978-1989 and 1990-1995. In the first sub-period 
the average propensity to migrate increases by an annual average of 1. 71 % of the labour force. In the 
second sub-period the average propensity to migrate falls by an annual average of O. 96% of the labour 
force. 
In the first sub-period there was a significant increase in average levels of educational attainment 
among those of working age. This increased the supply of skilled labour to the Irish labour market at 
a time when the demand for labour was generally low (even though the demand for labour was itself 
also shifting in favour of more skilled labour, (Kearney, 1997)). This change is reflected in the shift 
towards more highly educated migrants in this period with a higher average propensity to migrate. 
During this period there was also a weakening of the migration flows between Ireland and the UK 
with a significant increase in emigration to the USA in the early 1980s. These changes occurred 
against a backdrop of a rise in the population in the 25-44 age group. 
13 
The fall in the average propensity to migrate in the 1990s is largely due to the significant increase in 
the demand for labour in recent years. In addition Fahey, Fitz Gerald, and Maitre (1998, pI5) argue 
that the change in educational profile of migrants makes them more likely to return. The dominant 
outflow of migrants in the 1980s was in the 15-24 age cohort13 . In the early and mid 1990s these 
emigrants were still young enough to be highly mobile. However it is also likely that this estimated 
decline in the average propensity to migrate is capturing a general weakening of the links between the 
Irish and UK labour markets. In recent years (1994-1997) around 40% of the gross inflow of migrants 
were non-Irish nationals (Barrett, 1998). 
Table I 
Marf!inal Effect on Net Mif!ration of One Percentaf!e Point Increase In: 
Irish Unemployment Rate Relative Irish-UK Wages 
1956-1977 7,480 -1,344 
1978-1989 7,964 -1,344 
1990-1995 7,998 -1,344 
1956-1995 7,695 -1,344 
% of Actual Labour Force 
1956-1977 0.66% -0.12% 
1978-1989 0.62% -0.10% 
1990-1995 0.59% -0.10% 
1956-1995 0.64% -0.11% 
Table I shows the estimated marginal effect on net migration of a one percentage point increase in the 
Irish unemployment rate, given the actual UK unemployment rate in each sub-period. In the period 
1951-1977 a one percentage point increase in the Irish unemployment rate would have increased net 
migration on average by 7,467 migrants. This marginal impact increased in subsequent periods, in 
1990-1995 it was close to 8,000. However when we take into account the growth in the labour force14 
between 1951 and 1995 we find that in proportionate terms this marginal effect of the unemployment 
rate on net migration is declining. In 19 51-1977 the increase in migration caused by a one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate was equivalent to 0.66% of the actual labour force. This fell 
to 0.59% in the later 1990-1995 period. 
The marginal effect of relative wages on migration is -13 4. 4. Thus a one percentage point increase in 
the ratio of Irish wages to UK wages will, other things being equal, cause a fall in net migration of 
1,344 which is equivalent to 0.11% of the labour force. The convergence of Irish wages towards UK 
13 The 15-24 age group accounted for 79% of total net migration in the 1986/1991 intercensal period 
(Barrett, 1998). 
14 The labour force here refers to the actual labour force rather than the pre-migration labour force. 
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wages,.during the 1960s and 1970s thus forms an important part of the explanation for migration 
patterns in those decades. 
The high level of net migration flows in Ireland means that the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment (the so-called Phillips Curve effect) is very weak We use our estimated migration 
equation to infer the relationship between wages and unemployment in Ireland in the absence of 
migration. 
Figure 14 
Relative Employment Actual and Fitted Values Given Zero Net Migration 
Plotted against Relative Wages 
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Figure 14 plots the fitted 'no migration' values of the relative employment variable implied by the net 
migration equation against the actual values of relative wages over the period. In addition the chart 
includes the actual values of relative employment. There are three distinct sub-periods corresponding 
to the shifts in the estimated relationship in 1978 and 1990. 
By comparing the actual and fitted values of relative employment we can get an indication of the 
weakening of the Phillips Curve effect attributable to migration. The widest divergence between the 
actual and fitted values occurs in the area oflow relative wages (the interval [0.4, 0.6] on the x-axis). 
Over this entire interval the actual values for relative employment are equal to or above the 0.95 
equilibrium unemployment gap estimated by Honohan (1984 ). However notice the much higher fitted 
values for relative employment. The trade-off between wages and unemployment was clearly 
dampened via the migration mechanism. 
Figure 15 plots the fitted 'no migration' values for relative wages against actual relative employment. 
Note that the fitted relative wage values never fall below 0.60. This implies that as long as relative 
wages were below 0.60 net migration would be positive. If we accept Honohan's estimate of a 5% 
equilibrium unemployment gap then the implied relative wage given zero net migration is of the order 
of O. 80. The relative wage is lower than one because Ireland is the preferred location. 
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Figure 15 
Relative Wages Actual and Fitted Values Given Zero Net Migration 
Plotted against Relative Employment 
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Our estimated migration equation is partial equilibrium in nature. It does not allow for feedback 
effects. This is compounded by the fact that we are modelling net migration flows where there are 
different push and pull forces in operation for different cohorts in driving the decision to migrate or 
stay vis-a-vis the decision to remain abroad or to return. Nonetheless it captures key features of the 
Irish labour market. Our results indicate that the supply of labour in Ireland is very sensitive to labour 
market conditions. This means that the trade-off between wages and unemployment is weaker than in 
more closed labour markets. Significant changes in the profile of the average migrant over the period 
have weakened traditional links with the UK labour market in the post-war period. This weakening is 
likely to continue as we face into a period of substantial flows of non-Irish migrants. 
Conclusions 
The experience of the Irish economy over the period 1930 to 1960 shows that free movement of labour 
is not sufficient to ensure convergence in wage rates (and living standards) even where there is 
substantial movement of labour. However, the mobility of labour both into and out of Ireland has had 
an important impact on the performance of the economy in recent years. It has made the supply of 
labour in Ireland significantly more elastic than it would be in a closed economy. At times when the 
economy is growing rapidly, such as today, it has helped to relax capacity constraints allowing more 
rapid growth than would otherwise have been possible. 
The increased elasticity of labour supply arising from the possibility of migration has also provided 
some insulation when the economy has been hit by specific shocks. When the Irish economy has 
performed poorly in the past while other EU economies, especially the UK, have performed well, many 
Irish people have chosen emigration instead of unemployment. This has reduced the purely domestic 
impact of shocks, as in thel 980s, when the unemployment rate was lower than it would otherwise have 
been due to the outflow. However, as discussed above, the impact of emigration on unemployment is 
much less than one for one; those who leave are not necessarily those who would be unemployed. 
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The availability of the migration mechanism has meant that adjustment to shocks to the economy has 
tended to come more through migration than through wage flexibility. The failure to identify a 
significant Phillips curve effect may be due to the fact that labour market pressures have always been 
relieved at an early stage through migration. If the labour market had been closed wage rates would 
eventually have been forced to adjust to restore equilibrium after shocks. This is reflected in the small 
impact of unemployment as measured in wage rate equations (Fitz Gerald, 1998). When economic 
circumstances are particularly unfavourable in Ireland this may not be reflected in unemployment if 
there are simultaneously good job opportunities outside the country. As a result, the Irish 
unemployment rate may not be the appropriate variable to include in a wage rate equation. The UK 
unemployment rate may prove at least as good an indicator of domestic labour market tensions in 
Ireland if, as Honohan and others suggest, it ultimately drives the Irish rate through the migration 
mechanism. 
The long-term impact of migration by skilled labour on the economy can not be measured without a 
more formal model of the economy. However, there is evidence that skilled labour is complimentary to 
capital in the manufacturing sector (Kearney, 1998). As indicated above, migration has increased the 
elasticity of labour supply so that wage rates for skilled labour in the private sector have probably risen 
more slowly than they might otherwise have done. Thus the availability of additional skilled labour 
through the migration mechanism has probably been good for business. In allowing firms to expand 
their activities more rapidly it has facilitated more rapid growth. The higher level of output made 
possible by the outward shift in the supply of labour has probably also benefited unskilled labour. 
There is little evidence that unskilled labour can be easily substituted for skilled labour. However, the 
rapid growth in incomes has seen, as a corollary, a rapid growth in expenditure on certain kinds of 
services, which employ unskilled labour. As a result, there now appears also to be a tightening in the 
market for unskilled labour. 
The significant net immigration is also having an indirect effect on the economy through increasing the 
pressure on the physical infrastructure. The most notable example of this is the housing market. 
Because most of the gross inflow are in their late 20s and early 30s they need independent 
accommodation while those who go are probably leaving from their parents' homes. The result is that 
even with net immigration of only 15,000 to 20,000 there is a very significant impact on housing 
demand. Using a demographic model of the Irish economy we estimate that the net immigration of the 
last year has added almost 6,000 to the demand for additional dwellings. This is a very significant 
increase, even in the context of the current rate of new building of 40,000 a year. This increment to 
demand is a major factor in the current increase in house prices. The additional immigration by people 
taking up relatively well paid jobs has also added to the congestion costs consequent on inadequate 
urban transport infrastructure. 
The changing structure of the economy, the tightening labour market and the impending reduction in 
the supply of labour in the next decade (Fahey, Fitz Gerald, and Maitre, 1998) all suggest the need to 
re-examine current industrial and labour market policies. In the past when making decisions on 
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subsidies to attract foreign firms it was considered appropriate to assign a very low shadow price to 
labour reflecting the high level of unemployment. More recently it has been suggested that the shadow 
price should be close to or equal to one (Honohan, 1996). However, if many of the new jobs are going 
to returning emigrants (or immigrants) when the economy is already booming there may be a need to 
reconsider policy. Each additional family living in Ireland puts further pressure on the housing stock 
and on the overburdened urban infrastructure. As a result, it may be more appropriate in project 
appraisal to consider a shadow price of labour greater than one reflecting the negative externalities that 
each additional job imposes on the economy. 
In the longer term, now that the fertility rate has fallen below natural replacement, an argument could 
be made for immigration in promoting long-term balance in the population. It could help maintain a 
balanced age structure in the future, avoiding the "greying" problems currently faced in a quite acute 
form by Germany and Japan. In the shorter term, as the population ages, immigration may be important 
in providing an additional stimulus of new energy. However, it is much too early yet to make any 
assumptions about the long-term trends in fertility and a very high proportion of the population is 
currently in the young adult age groups. 
Finally, in considering what is the "optimal" policy on migration, from an economic point of view, the 
situation is rather different from other countries, such as the United States. Because so many of the 
immigrants are in fact returning emigrants the attitudes and expectations of the citizens living in Ireland 
is rather different from those of citizens of other countries faced with immigrants with no strong 
connection with the country. While it maybe reasonable to assume that in many countries the objective 
function to be maximised is the welfare of the existing inhabitants, in the Irish case there is 
considerable satisfaction among parents and friends living in Ireland in the face of a substantial influx 
of returning emigrants. 
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